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Conflicting Interests Of Attorney Representing
Both Insured And Insurer
Fidelity Casualty Co. of N. Y. v. McConnaughyl
In the case under discussion (see facts supra - previous
note) the insured was held to have breached the cooperation clause of his automobile liability insurance policy. He
argued in defense that because of alleged unethical conduct on the part of the attorney who was hired by the
insurance company to represent him, this breach should be
inoperative and the insurer should be estopped from asserting it. Briefly, the conduct alleged was the following:
Fidelity's attorney, while representing the insured in a tort
action, learned that the insured had procured two witnesses
to testify falsely in his behalf. Without disclosing this
knowledge or its significance to the defendant, the attorneys interrogated him and proceeded to take his deposition
in such a manner that he finally admitted his deceit. The
additional information placed the attorney's employer, the
insurer, in a position to disclaim liability under the policy,
which it did nine days later.
The Maryland Court of Appeals, Judge Hammond,
stated that the attorneys had erred in continuing to represent the insured after having gained information concerning the possible breach of cooperation clause in his policy.'
The Court reasoned that while it is customary for insurance
policies to contain clauses whereby the insured is required
to relinquish the control over the defense of any claims to
the insurer and attorneys of its choosing, and that such advanced consent on the part of the insured negates the improper relationship created by such dual representation,
where in the course of dual representation, actual conflict
between the interests of the two parties develops, the lawyer must elect either to represent one of the clients only, or
withdraw from the case entirely.3 However, the Court,
while admonishing the attorneys involved, held that the
insurer did not thereby waive its right to disclaim liability
for non-cooperation or become estopped to do so.
"We are not persuaded that because the [insurer] verified its belief that there had been a breach of the policy
provisions by Butler, through lawyers who continued
to represent it and the insured at a time when their
1228 Md. 1, 179 A. 2d 117 (1962).
2Id., 12.
8Id., 10.

1963]

FID. AND CAS. CO. v. McCONNAUGHY

253

interests were not parallel, it lost whatever rights it
would have had."4
The purpose of this note is to discuss (1) the ethical
problem an attorney faces in insurance cases where such a
conflict of interest occurs, and (2) the consequences which
may be imposed on the insurance company which he
represents.5
The standard policy of automobile insurance requires
the following duties of the insurance company:
a. That it shall defend any suit against the insured
alleging injury and claiming damage.
b. That it shall pay any judgment rendered against the
insured covered by the policy.
c. That it shall pay all expenses incurred by it and all
tax costs and interest accrued after entry of the
judgment.
The standard policy of automobile insurance requires
the following duties of the insured:
a. To give the insurance company prompt notice of the
accident, claim or suit.
b. To give assistance and cooperation in opposing such
suit or claim.
c. To subrogate the insurance company for any amount
paid by it to the insured.
It is readily apparent from an analysis of their respective
rights and duties that a community of interest exists between the company and the insured as a result of the insurance contract in regard to any actions brought by a third
party against the insured within the scope of the policy
limitations. In commenting upon this relationship the
American Bar Association said: "The essential point of
ethics involved is that the lawyer so employed shall represent the insured as his client with undivided fidelity as
required by Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Ethics."
'Id., 12. (Emphasis added).

This note restricts itself to the insurance area. See the following for
comprehensive analysis of related areas:
"Validity and effect of divorce as affected by representation of both
parties by same attorney." 16 A.L.R. 427 (1922) ; "Propriety and
effect of attorney representing interest adverse to that of former
client." 51 A.L.R. 1307 (1927) supp. 126 A.L.R. 1271 (1940): "Attorney's representation of parties adversely interested as affecting judgment or estoppel in respect thereof." 154 A.L.R. 501 (1944).
OAMERICAN BAR AssOcIATIoN, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROEs-

SIONAL ETHIcS AND GRIEVANCES, Opinion No. 282 - "Conflicting Interest Lawyer for Insurance Company representing insured." May 27, 1950 at
p. 591.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXIII

The suggestion that Canon 6 should be rigidly adhered
to in this type of situation has been followed by an increasing number of courts dealing with this question. The
Maryland Court of Appeals approaches the problem by
quoting the pertinent language of Canon 6:
"It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests,
except by express consent of all concerned given after
a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of
this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests
when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend
for that' 7which duty to another client requires him to
oppose.
While the wording of this canon clearly appears applicable to the factual situation under discussion, it has only
been in recent years that the courts have examined an
attorney's conduct in this light. As a result of an increasing
awareness on the part of the courts to the practical significance which such a relationship creates, a growing number
of decisions have stressed the language of Canon 6.8 In the
words of a recent New York case,9 which is quoted with
approval by the Maryland court:'0
"The court may not close its eyes to the obvious. The
prime interest of these attorneys is the insurance company, in whose behalf they may defend cases year after
year. Where the interests of the carrier and the client
run parallel with each other, the attorneys undoubtedly
will exert their best efforts to protect the interests of
their client, since in so doing, they will also be protecting the interests of their real principal. But where,
as in this case, the interests are adverse one to the
other, then the attorneys may not 'assist the lost traveler along the road and at the same time prepare a
trap into which he will ultimately fall.' "11
By placing an emphasis on Canon 6, the courts have determined that the test of the attorney's conduct will be judged
7Supra,
n. 1, 9. See Canon 6 of the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION. CANONS
OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS: CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS (1948) 5. This was
adopted by the Maryland State Bar Association on June 25, 1948, (see
Vol. 53 of the Transactions of the Maryland State Bar Association,
p. 198). See also the Baltimore City Bar Association Charter and Bylaws,
Code of Professional Ethics and Judicial Ethics, issued in September,
1959.
1E.g., Allstate Insurance Company v. ,Keller, 17 Ill. App. 2d 44, 149
N.E. 2d 482 (1958); Schwartz v. Sar Corporation, 19 Misc. 2d 660, 195
N.Y.S. 2d 496 (1959) ; Van Dyke v. White, 55 Wash. 2d 601, 349 P. 2d 430
(1960).
"1 0Schwartz v. Sar Corporation, Ibid.
Supra, n. 1, 11.
Schwartz v. Sar Corporation, supra, n. 8, 503.
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solely by the existence of a potential conflict between his
clients, and the attorney's motives or intentions of honesty
are irrelevant. The present state of the law is succinctly
stated by the Maryland Court of Appeals:
"We have no doubt whatever that the lawyers who
represented Butler and the insurance company were
activated by honest, high and worthy motives and intent in taking their client Butler's deposition, but this
is not the test for determining compliance with the
Canons of Professional Ethics when a lawyer is con-

fronted with the necessity of choosing between conflicting interests. The standards of the Canons require
undeviating fidelity of the lawyer to his client and no
exception can be tolerated.

'"

There are two other canons, both of which are mentioned by the Maryland Court, which are applicable to the
lawyer's conduct in this situation. Canon 3713 provides that
it is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences,

which duty outlasts the lawyer's employment. 4 This canon,
as amended in 1937, elaborates upon the provision of the
original 1908 Canon 6, which stated the lawyer's "obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not
to divulge his secrets or confidences. . .

."

"The reason for

the rule lies in the fact that it is essential to the administration of justice that there should be perfect freedom of
consultation by client with attorney without any apprehension of a compelled disclosure by the attorney to the
detriment of the client."' 5
Supra, n. 1, 12, See Van Dyke v. White, supra, n. 8, 437.
"The high professional standing of the attorneys employed by the
respondent to represent White at the trial of the negligence 'action
justifies the assumption that in so doing their motives and intent
were honest, but this is not the test for determining a lawyer's
conduct when confronted with the necessity of choosing between
conflicting interests. The standards of the legal profession require
undeviating fidelity of the lawyer to his client. No exception can be
tolerated."
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, op. cit.

supra, n. 7, 21.
14The privilege of nondisclosure of the client's communication to his
lawyer, embodied in Canon 37, has long been part of the common law.
Winters v. Winters, 102 Ia. 53, 71 N.W. 184, 185 (1897).
Also see 8
WiGMORE (3d ed. 1961) § 2292. During the 16th cen. when the rule
first appeared, it was apparently based on a consideration for the oath
and honor of the lawyer, rather than for the purpose of quieting the
fears of a client, 8 WIGMORE (3d ed. 1961) § 2290. Later and in more
modern times it has been deemed, to rest on the principle that it was
important to promote freedom of consultation between legal advisers and
their clients.
'5

OPINIONS OF THE) COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES,

op. cit. supra, n. 6, Opinion 91, p. 202.
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Canon 41 is also applicable, and presents the reverse side
to the above mentioned rules, 6 i.e., when and to whom an
attorney may breach this duty of confidence:
"When a lawyer discovers that some fraud or deception has been practiced, which has unjustly imposed
upon the court or a party, he should endeavor to
rectify it; at first by advising his client, and if his
client refuses to forgo the advantage thus unjustly
gained, he should promptly inform the injured person
or his 17counsel, so that they may take appropriate
steps.'
The three canons taken together prescribe the principles
by which a lawyer should be governed when he is faced
with the problem under discussion. The New York Court
of Appeals in a careful examination of the problem synthesized the rules as follows:
"The lawyer may not take up the cudgels of this insurance carrier, when its interests are diametrically
opposed to the interests of the insured.... He is not
required to participate in or to help in perpetrating a
fraud, and if he is satisfied that his client is so conducting himself, it is his duty as an officer of the court to
withdraw as counsel. He may not, however, take up
the defense of the one upon whom the fraud is sought
to be practiced, particularly where he has already
received the confidence of his client."'"
When a court determines that an attorney has breached
his duty of professional ethics by simultaneously representing an insured and insurer whose interests conflict, the
court must decide what if any penalty should be imposed
against the insurance company because of the lawyer's
conduct. It is important to remember that in most instances
the insured's breach of the duty to cooperate would, if given
full effect, avoid liability on the part of the insurer.19
The right of an insurance company to forfeit an insurance policy may be lost through the doctrine of waiver or
- AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, op. Cit.
supra, n. 7, 22.
17Ibid.
Is Schwartz v. gar Corporation, supra, n. 8, 503.
19 The courts are divided as to the question of whether the burden of
going forward with the evidence as to the non-fulfillment of the cooperation clause should be placed on the insured or the insurer. Practically, it
makes little difference, for in any event it is a material part of the
policy, and a breach of the provision by the insured, in a material respect
(see supra, n. 18) constitutes a defense to liability on the policy by the
insurer in the absence of waiver or estoppel. See Glen Falls Indemnity
Co. v. Keliher, 88 N.H. 253, 187 A. 473, 475 (1936); 29A AM. JUR. 583,
Insurance, § 1471.
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estoppel." While these principles have importance throughout the law,2 they take on added significance in the law of
insurance. When applied to insurance they are frequently
treated as synonymous, and as denoting similar concepts,
or, in some instances, complementary concepts. In fact,
however, there is a well recognized distinction between
the two that is rigidly adhered to in the more carefully reasoned opinions.2 Waiver connotes a voluntary agreement,
express or implied, to relinquish a known right.2 3 Estoppel
is not based upon contract, but rests instead on the principle, that where one party has by his representations or his
conduct induced another party to a transaction to give him
an advantage which would be against equity and good conscience for him to assert, he would not in a court of justice
be permitted to avail himself of that advantage.2 4 When a
court recognizes a waiver it is carrying out the intention
of the party who is waiving. On the other hand, when an
estoppel is enforced the inequitable intent of the party
estopped is defeated. It is possible that the same conduct
may constitute both an implied waiver and an estoppel.
Whether or not the equitable doctrine of estoppel applies
depends upon the facts of each particular case.
The decisions which have considered the doctrines of
waiver and estoppel as applied to the factual situation presented by the case being noted, are divided. In the principal case, the Maryland Court of Appeals did "not think
that the insurance company ... waived its right to disclaim
liability . . . or became estopped to do so. ' 5 The Court's
attitude was that the "insurer, through its own claim investigator, or through counsel who did not represent Butler, could have ascertained what Butler disclosed to his
lawyers, '2 61 if in fact it hadn't already become aware of
0 Commonwealth Casualty Co. v. Arrigo, 160 Md. 595, 154 A. 136, 77
A.L.R. 1250 (1931). Royal Ins. Co. v. Drury, 150 Md. 211, 132 A. 635, 45
A.L.R. 582 (1926).
"In probably one-third to one-half of the law suits between insured
and insurer involving the validity or unenforcdability of the contract, it
is claimed by the insured and denied by the insurer that the latter has
waived a defense that it is now asserting." PATrERsoN, ESSENTIAiLS OF
INSURANCE LAW

(1935) § 93, p. 418.
(3d ed. 1951) 475 and cases listed in n. 17 therein.

2 VANCE, INSURANCE

Note also that Vance considers that the majority of the courts treat the
concepts as synonymous (cases listed in n. 21 to p. 475).
2 McFarland v. Farm Bureau Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 201 Md. 241, 93
A. 2d 551 (1952) ; Royal Ins. Co. v. Drury, supra, n. 20.
" See Gould v. Transamerican, 224 Md. 285, 294-297, 167 A. 2d 905
(1961) for definition and distinction between waiver and estoppel.
21 Fidelity Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. McConnaughy, 228 Md. 1, 12, 179
A. 2d 117 (1962).
20Ibid.
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Butler's fraud in taking the deposition of the witness whom
Butler had procured to testify falsely in his behalf.
The conclusion of the Court of Appeals is contrary to
the majority of decisions which have dealt with the issue.
In the leading case of Allstate Ins. Co. v. Keller,2 7 an opposite result was reached. There the insured had breached
the cooperation clause of his policy by falsely stating that
he and not his girl friend had been driving at the time of
the accident. Approximately nine months later the insured
gave a correct version of the accident to the insurer. Thereafter, the insurer's attorneys took the deposition of the
insured who repeated the correct version of the accident.
At the trial of the case the attorney who had been employed
by the insurer admitted that he had taken the insured's
deposition for the purpose of subsequently using it against
him. The Court held that because of the conduct of the
attorney the insurance company had waived the breach of
the cooperation clause.28
The applicability of waiver or estoppel being imposed
against an insurance company due to unethical conduct on
the part of its attorneys has also been carefully examined
by the New York courts - the most recent case being
(1958). The Maryland Court cited
27 117 Ill. App. 2d 44, 149 N.E. 2d 482
this case with approval for the proposition that the attorneys acted
unethically.
2 The Allstate case lists three analogous cases as authority for their
decision, the first two of which are also cited by the Maryland Court.
In Helm v. Inter-Insurance Exchange for Auto. Club, 354 Mo. 935, 192
S.W. 2d 417, 167 A.L.R. 238 (1946), the attorneys learned during voir
dire that the insured was only fifteen land thus not covered by the policy
which was limited to those sixteen years and older. During recess this
information was confirmed and the attorneys withdrew from the case.
On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court quoted Canon 6 and upheld the
trial court's ruling that under the circumstances granting leave to the
lawyer to withdraw was the proper action. In Hammett v. McIntyre,
114 Cal. App. 2d 148, 249 P. 2d 885 (1952), an attorney hired by an
insurance carrier represented both the insured automobile owner and a
driver of the owner's automobile. The liability policy contained provisions extending coverage only to persons operating an automobile with
the named insured's consent. Thus, when an answer was filed on
behalf of insured that the automobile in question was driven without
his consent, and the driver denied this allegation, it was held that the
driver, due to the conflict of interest on the part of the lawyer representing him, had been deprived of a fair :trial essential to due process.
In Reynolds v. Maramorosch, 208 Misc. 626, 144 N.Y.S. 2d 900 (1955)
an 'action based upon negligence in an automobile accident was brought
by two unemancipated infants against their father. The attorneys, who
were furnished by the insurance company to the father, without getting
authorization from the father, filed a motion to dismiss the suit on the
grounds that unemancipated infants in New York may not maintain an
action for ordinary negligence against their parents. The company's
motion to dismiss was held not to be properly before the court, because
of an affidavit filed by the father that denied the attorneys the authority
to file such a motion. The court held that this affidavit created a conflict
of interest for the attorney, and thus placed him under a disability.
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2 9 There,
Schwartz v. Sar Corporation.
an attorney hired by
the insurer became suspicious of possible collusion between
the insured, who was the defendant and driver in an automobile accident case, and the injured plaintiff, who was
his uncle. After a personal investigation the lawyer issued
an affidavit charging his own client, the insured, with attempting to commit a felony, attempted larceny, perjury,
and conspiracy with the plaintiff to defraud. The Court
held that regardless of the truth or falsity of these charges
the insurance company had, by continuing with the defense
of the insured through an attorney who was obviously
working against the insured's best interests, committed an
act which "undoubtedly
amounts to a waiver of a later
8'
claim of non-liability.
The most recent analysis of the problem, excluding the
instant case, was in 1960 by the Washington Supreme Court

in the case of Van Dyke v. White."' In finding a waiver of

the insured's breach of the cooperation clause because the
insurer had continued the defense of the assured in spite of
219
Misc. 2d 660, 195 N.Y.S. 2d 496 (1959). The Schwartz opinion
relied heavily on American Employers Ins. Co. v. Goble Aircraft Sp.,
205 Misc. 1066, 131 N.Y.S. 2d 393 (1954). There an attorney paid by
a casualty company, undertook the defense of a policyholder, and in
doing so attempted to save the company money by not bringing in all
possible witnesses expert and lay, who could help his client. The Court
held that the lawyer's first duty was to his client and that every effort
should be made in his behalf, even if this increased the cost to the
insurer beyond the limit of the policy coverage. The Goble case in turn
relied on Loew v. Gillespie, 90 Misc. 616, 153 N.Y.S. 830 (1915).
3 Schwartz v. Sar Corporation, supra, n. 29, 504.
55 Wash. 2d 601, 349 P. 2d 430 (1960). The Van Dyke case makes a
reference to a factor which frequently has a controlling influence on a
court's decision as to the applicability of the doctrines of waiver or
estoppel, i.e., the absence (as in the Van Dyke case) or presence, of an
assertion of a reservation of rights on the part of the insurance company.
Where an insurance company, usually through its attorney who is representing the insured, notifies the insured that its continued control of the
defense of his action is only an exercise of its rights under the policy
and is not a waiver of any of its defenses against the insured, the courts
will not raise a waiver or estoppel. Thus, if an insured breaches the
cooperation clause of an automobile liability policy, and thereafter the
insurer and the insured expressly agree that a continuation in the
defense of the suit by the insurer shall not be construed as a waiver
of the insurer's right to deny liability under the policy, the act Of the
insurer is not 'a waiver of the breach of the cooperation clause of the
policy. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. v. Mitnick, 180 Md. 604, 26 A. 2d
393 (1942). As to the proper form required for an insurer to reserve its
rights to contest liability under a policy, there is almost no statutory
law and very few cases on point. There is nothing "which requires such
notice on the part of an insurer, . . . to be in the form of a non-waiver
agreement, or in any particular form. All that seems to be required is
notice to the insured that the insurer will defend under a reservation
of its rights." Van Dyke v. White, supra, 434, (emphasis added) quoting
Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Wachsmith, 2 Wash. 2d 679, 99 P. 2d 420,
426, 127 A.L.R. 531 (1940) which held that notice to the lawyer of the
insured was not sufficient to prevent a waiver.
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the insured's refusal to attend trial, the Washington Court
also states that "there is another compelling reason why
respondent waived its defense of non-cooperation .. ."2
When the defendant left the state and failed to appear for
trial his attorney had the choice of asking for a continuance
or proceeding with the defense of the case without the
insured and he chose the latter. "Obviously this choice was
to improve its own position in any future attempt to enforce
liability under the policy. At this point, whom did the
attorney, employed by respondent [the insurer] to defend
the action, represent, the policyholder ... or the respondent?" In answering its own question, the Court concluded
34
that he was in fact primarily representing the insurer.
The majority of the courts favor imposing a waiver or
estoppel on the insurance company when an attorney who
it has employed breaches the principle embodied in Canon
6 of the Code of Professional Ethics. This approach should
have great success in curtailing the present day abuses
which exist in this area, and it is hoped the courts of
Maryland will restrict the instant decision to its exact facts.
The Court of Appeals left the door open to this by its
favorable recognition of the cases elsewhere and its decision
of the instant case on its peculiar facts.
DAVID S. CORDISH

Subordination Of Stockholder Loans On The Ground
Of Corporate Undercapitalization
Obre v. Alban Tractor Company'
In 1959 appellant and another individual formed a
Maryland corporation in accordance with a capital structure agreement providing for equal corporate control. In
Van Dyke v. White, 55 Wash. 2d 601, 349 P. 2d 430, 435 (1960).
' 3 Id., 436.
"The dissent in Van Dyke decided the case on the issue of whether the
injured party who has recovered a judgment against the insured, can
assert the rights of the assured. While the Van Dyke dissent answered
this in the negative, the majority and, it is submitted, better rule allows
the injured party the identical rights against the insurance company as
the insured. Thus, if the policyholder has breached the cooperation
clause of his policy, the injured party cannot recover from the insurer
of the policy; however, if the insurer has waived or become estopped
to assert this breach against the policyholder, it is also denied 'the right
to assert the breach against the injured party. The issue raised by the
Van Dyke dissent is rarely considered by the courts as applied to the
area under discussion. See 29A AM. JuR. 605, Insurance, § 1496 for
support of the majority approach.
"

'228 Md. 291, 179 A. 2d 861 (1962).

